Mananaging Hazards and Mitigating the Consequences
The management of natural hazards relates to the mitigation of the consequences. Successful management reduces the impacts. Management of hazards can be divided into three types, preparation, emergency response and long term recovery.
Preparation
There are many ways people can prepare for hazards. These include, prediction, education and building and infrastructure for defense and shelter. Each methos of preparation is important but not all hazards are predictable and not all countries can have the resources to build infrastructure to mitigate the consequences.
Prediction
Many hazards can be predicted to some extent. Volconoes become increasingly active and increase emmissions of sulphur gases ahead of eruption. Sometimes they change shape and increase in size. Tropical storms can be tracked by satellite and using predictive cones and from which their potenial tracks can be predicted. Earthquakes however are less predictable, although earthquakes are known to migrate along fault lines and increased seismic activity proceeds and follows large earthquakes, e.g. aftershocks. There are many theories for their prediction but there is no one accepted method for prediction.
Preparation
There are many ways people can prepare for hazards. These include, prediction, education and building and infrastructure for defense and shelter. Each methos of preparation is important but not all hazards are predictable and not all countries can have the resources to build infrastructure to mitigate the consequences.
Prediction
Many hazards can be predicted to some extent. Volconoes become increasingly active and increase emmissions of sulphur gases ahead of eruption. Sometimes they change shape and increase in size. Tropical storms can be tracked by satellite and using predictive cones and from which their potenial tracks can be predicted. Earthquakes however are less predictable, although earthquakes are known to migrate along fault lines and increased seismic activity proceeds and follows large earthquakes, e.g. aftershocks. There are many theories for their prediction but there is no one accepted method for prediction.
Because earthquakes are not easy to predict a lot of research is put into understanding them better. Satelllite imagery can be used to capture still shots of the earth's surface before and after an earthquake. Then using remote sensing overlays the change in shape of the surface can be produced. This can be seen in the displacement map to the left for Santa Clara, in California. Through close anlaysis scientists can better undertstand how faults move and how the surface responds to that movement. With this knowledge we can better understand the impacts of earthquakes and prepare better for them. The following video features Professor Bob Holdsworth from the Uuiversity of Durham. He explains the research using remote sensory overlays. |
Education
As explained already in the video there is a great need for research into earthquakes and other hazards. If scientists can understand hazards better they can more accurately predict the consequences and mitigate the impacts. Research in seismicly active regions, at volcanoes and in regions vulnerable to tropical storms is essential for improving the way we manage future hazards.
Another important aspect of edcuation is increasing the perception of risk and making people aware of potential risks. This way they are able to respond effectively and make the right choices when experiencing a natural hazard. Many well developed countries and regions invest heavily in educational programmes to increase people perception of risk. Other less developed countries are not as effective in raising perception of risk. The following two videos demonstrate two ways to educate people on the potential risks with hazards. In Cuba people are educated in schools and through annual hurricane awareness drills. In California the Great Shakeout is annual event for raising perception of risk and educating people on how to respond. This hard hitting video is quite effective in getting message about the risks of earthquakes as well how to react during and after one.
As explained already in the video there is a great need for research into earthquakes and other hazards. If scientists can understand hazards better they can more accurately predict the consequences and mitigate the impacts. Research in seismicly active regions, at volcanoes and in regions vulnerable to tropical storms is essential for improving the way we manage future hazards.
Another important aspect of edcuation is increasing the perception of risk and making people aware of potential risks. This way they are able to respond effectively and make the right choices when experiencing a natural hazard. Many well developed countries and regions invest heavily in educational programmes to increase people perception of risk. Other less developed countries are not as effective in raising perception of risk. The following two videos demonstrate two ways to educate people on the potential risks with hazards. In Cuba people are educated in schools and through annual hurricane awareness drills. In California the Great Shakeout is annual event for raising perception of risk and educating people on how to respond. This hard hitting video is quite effective in getting message about the risks of earthquakes as well how to react during and after one.
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Infrastructure
Infrastructure can be used to reduce the impact of hazards in hazard prone regions. Examples include, sea walls, enlarged levees, embankments, dams, barrages, earthquake resistent buildings. Examples include the Delta Plan in Netherlands where a series of dams and raises levees have been built. The Thames barrier is the second largest tidal barrier in the world and was built in prevent flooding of London. In other ways softer engineering can be used to reduce the impact of hazards such as in Bangladesh, where people plant mangroves to create a natural buffer to tidal surges associated with cyclones. Other examples can be seen in cyclone shelters where people in Bangladesh take refuge against the worst of the tidal surges.
Infrastructure can be used to reduce the impact of hazards in hazard prone regions. Examples include, sea walls, enlarged levees, embankments, dams, barrages, earthquake resistent buildings. Examples include the Delta Plan in Netherlands where a series of dams and raises levees have been built. The Thames barrier is the second largest tidal barrier in the world and was built in prevent flooding of London. In other ways softer engineering can be used to reduce the impact of hazards such as in Bangladesh, where people plant mangroves to create a natural buffer to tidal surges associated with cyclones. Other examples can be seen in cyclone shelters where people in Bangladesh take refuge against the worst of the tidal surges.
The following video describes the efforts the Dutch government will take to combat future sea level rise. As part of their plans the Dutch will build major engineered defenses, create flood zones for rivers and even consider floating houses to adapt to changing sea levels.
This next video shows the use of cyclone shelters in Bangladesh. Cyclone shelters have been built on raised columns above the level of the tidal surge. It also shows how information is posted nearby, informing people how best to protect themselves against cyclones. The photograph below shows damaged earth polders, which are used as a first line of defense and refuge for cattle and stranded villages from rising flood waters and tidal surges. As you can many are in urgent need of maintenance and repair.
Earthquake Design
In many developed countries, buildings and infrastructure are designed to withstand seismic activity. There are many ways buildings are engineered. The image below taken from wikapedia lists the many different ways. The two videos show the latest technologies being used in tall building design.
In many developed countries, buildings and infrastructure are designed to withstand seismic activity. There are many ways buildings are engineered. The image below taken from wikapedia lists the many different ways. The two videos show the latest technologies being used in tall building design.
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Emergency Response
Evacuation The emergency response refers to the immediate actions that need to be taken in the first few hours and days following a natural hazard. One of the first steps of emergency response, which may overlap with preparation is evacuation. When early warning can be provided. e.g from tsunami buoys or satellite imagery then a well communicated and supported evacuation needs to take place. If a country is well resourced and well organised then the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of people is possible. Cuba demonstrates this every hurricane season. In the case of volcanic eruptions, hazard maps can be produced that map potential primary and secondary hazards. In this way red zones are identified where all people are compulsary evacuated. |
First Aid and Search and Rescue
In the immediate hours of a nutural disaster, people will be putting into action their personal Disaster Action Plans. Once evacuated this will involve meeting loved ones in a pre-arranged location and contacting someone out of town. You may need to survive on your own personal disaster kit untill support reaches you. However if there are injuries and fatalities, emergency support needs to be given, this involves providing first aid, search and rescue and the removal of dead bodies. People then need to be given food and water, clothing, blankets and shelter. Temporary hospitals and settlements may be required if the scale of the natural disaster is large. This was demonstrated in the L'Aquila earthquake response in Itlay 2009.
In the immediate hours of a nutural disaster, people will be putting into action their personal Disaster Action Plans. Once evacuated this will involve meeting loved ones in a pre-arranged location and contacting someone out of town. You may need to survive on your own personal disaster kit untill support reaches you. However if there are injuries and fatalities, emergency support needs to be given, this involves providing first aid, search and rescue and the removal of dead bodies. People then need to be given food and water, clothing, blankets and shelter. Temporary hospitals and settlements may be required if the scale of the natural disaster is large. This was demonstrated in the L'Aquila earthquake response in Itlay 2009.
Today search and resuce has become quite a sophisticated operation, often with teams of international response units flying into different regions of the world. These teams use trained sniffer dogs, remote cameras, and sound and heat sensors as part of their search and rescue. Heavy equipment is often needed to cut and remove material and teams of people work day in and day out shifting buckets of rubble one at a time, broken by small miraculous moments when they discover someone still alive and incredibly in the rarest of occasions more than a week after the initial event. The following two videos show the response to the L'Aquila earth quake in 2009.
Long Term Recovery
The Long term recovery refers to the reconstruction and development aid needed to return a place back to normality following a natural disaster. Long term recovery requires reconstruction of housing, schools and buildings, transport and vital service infrastructure as well as food and water sustainability. The speed at which a place can achieve this depends on the scale and severity of the impacts, the financial resources within the country as well as the scale of the international response. The success of the recovery also depends on effective organisation and involvement with all interest groups.
Another aspect of long term recovery involves the process of review and adjustment. Whilst the consequences of a natural disaster are are always catostrophic it does provide an opportunity for urban planners do things differently and learn from their mistakes. Through mapping the impacts of a disaster, e.g. through the Mercalli scale for example for earthquakes, the most vulnerable and safest areas of the city can be identified. This way vital services and high population density zones can be safer planned. Ahead of the Kobe earthquake in Japan 1995, the urban planners of Kobe already had a new city plan for its reconstruction before the earthquake struck. In addition reconstruction can invest in better technology and earthquake proof buildings.
Finally, as part of the long term recovery, countries can invest in more sophisticated early warning systems and communication routes. Bangladesh has invested heavily in appropriate communication for cyclone warnings, including transistor radios, and village reps who travel to more remote villages by motorcycle. Cuba has one of the most sophisticated and politically integrated systems for early warning. Following the 2001 tsunami in Indonesia and the surrounding region heavy investestment has been put into developing a tsunami warning system for the Indian Ocean similar to those already found in the east and west Pacific Ocean.
The Long term recovery refers to the reconstruction and development aid needed to return a place back to normality following a natural disaster. Long term recovery requires reconstruction of housing, schools and buildings, transport and vital service infrastructure as well as food and water sustainability. The speed at which a place can achieve this depends on the scale and severity of the impacts, the financial resources within the country as well as the scale of the international response. The success of the recovery also depends on effective organisation and involvement with all interest groups.
Another aspect of long term recovery involves the process of review and adjustment. Whilst the consequences of a natural disaster are are always catostrophic it does provide an opportunity for urban planners do things differently and learn from their mistakes. Through mapping the impacts of a disaster, e.g. through the Mercalli scale for example for earthquakes, the most vulnerable and safest areas of the city can be identified. This way vital services and high population density zones can be safer planned. Ahead of the Kobe earthquake in Japan 1995, the urban planners of Kobe already had a new city plan for its reconstruction before the earthquake struck. In addition reconstruction can invest in better technology and earthquake proof buildings.
Finally, as part of the long term recovery, countries can invest in more sophisticated early warning systems and communication routes. Bangladesh has invested heavily in appropriate communication for cyclone warnings, including transistor radios, and village reps who travel to more remote villages by motorcycle. Cuba has one of the most sophisticated and politically integrated systems for early warning. Following the 2001 tsunami in Indonesia and the surrounding region heavy investestment has been put into developing a tsunami warning system for the Indian Ocean similar to those already found in the east and west Pacific Ocean.
The Management of L'Aquila Earthquake 2009
Prediction
The management of the L'Aquila has both successes and failures.
As already stated earthquakes are extremely difficult to predict with no single accepted method for predicting earthquakes. However there were in the case of the L'Aquila earthquake a number of clear signals that could have been interpeted differently and acted upon more effectively. In fact, failure to do so has led to the unprecedented trial and conviction of six members of the scientific community and one government official in Italy. The judge described their warnings as "vague, generic and ineffective" The following Guardian article describes the case. The BBC article and report can be linked to via the image below.
Leading up to the earthquake there were many preshocks. These are low magnitude earthquakes that occure with high frequency. However there were so many that local people were afraid. On the night of the earthquake some people were saved because they chose to sleep in their cars. Others returned their houses because it was too cold in their cars. Another scientist Giampaolo Giuliani predicted the earthqauke from increased radon emmisons in local water sources. He posted it on the internet and others warned local people via a van and loud speaker. However, Giulani's prediction was dismissed at the time. In general with the earthquake taking place in the middle of the night people seemed unprepared for the earthquake
Had these warnings been interpreted better people may have evacuated older buildings, but in general people need to respond to public evacuation orders and no warning came
Officials were criticised in the aftermath of the eathquake about the quality of buildings. Tens of thousands of people lost their homes in the earthquake and the centre of L'Aquila remians off limits today as reconstruction continues. Many buildings including modern buildings collapsed or were damaged beyond what is condsidered safe. It was understandable for older buildings to collapse but for more modern buildings, accusations of cutting corners and ignoring building regulations were expressed. Some of the fatalities were also housed in older university buildings and hospitals. Should public buildings have been safer and better regulated?
Prediction
The management of the L'Aquila has both successes and failures.
As already stated earthquakes are extremely difficult to predict with no single accepted method for predicting earthquakes. However there were in the case of the L'Aquila earthquake a number of clear signals that could have been interpeted differently and acted upon more effectively. In fact, failure to do so has led to the unprecedented trial and conviction of six members of the scientific community and one government official in Italy. The judge described their warnings as "vague, generic and ineffective" The following Guardian article describes the case. The BBC article and report can be linked to via the image below.
Leading up to the earthquake there were many preshocks. These are low magnitude earthquakes that occure with high frequency. However there were so many that local people were afraid. On the night of the earthquake some people were saved because they chose to sleep in their cars. Others returned their houses because it was too cold in their cars. Another scientist Giampaolo Giuliani predicted the earthqauke from increased radon emmisons in local water sources. He posted it on the internet and others warned local people via a van and loud speaker. However, Giulani's prediction was dismissed at the time. In general with the earthquake taking place in the middle of the night people seemed unprepared for the earthquake
Had these warnings been interpreted better people may have evacuated older buildings, but in general people need to respond to public evacuation orders and no warning came
Officials were criticised in the aftermath of the eathquake about the quality of buildings. Tens of thousands of people lost their homes in the earthquake and the centre of L'Aquila remians off limits today as reconstruction continues. Many buildings including modern buildings collapsed or were damaged beyond what is condsidered safe. It was understandable for older buildings to collapse but for more modern buildings, accusations of cutting corners and ignoring building regulations were expressed. Some of the fatalities were also housed in older university buildings and hospitals. Should public buildings have been safer and better regulated?
There was an emormous positive in regard to the preparation phase of L'Aquila's management. Italy was able to quickly mobilise a vast number of specially trained relief workers and teams of nationwide volunteers as well as its military and emergency services. Search and rescue teams arrived within hours of the earthquake and makeshift hospitals and tent settlements were erected straight away with almost no need for international assitance. On this point Italy were clearly seen as world leaders in disaster response. However, given the frequency of both earthquakes and volcanic eruptions in Italy we shouldn't be too surprised by its ability to respond quickly.
Emergency Response
Italy's emergency response to the L'Aquila earthquake was impressive. The main agency in Italy for disaster response is the Protezion Civile. They worked in conjunction with the firefighters and Italian volunteers to provide for shelter, food, and safety of the survivors. Within 24 hours L'Aquila hospital had been completely replaced by the first of two field hospitals that arrived in the area. Meanwhile, early management of casualties was largely in the hands of the Italian armed forces, which employed ‘Medivac’ aerial evacuation techniques to remove seriously injured patients to hospitals outside the disaster area. The earliest actions included the total evacuation of town centres, including the entire historical core of L’Aquila. One of the firsts tasks was to set up and manage the 171 tent camps that were established for homeless survivors and provide safe, secure environments for them. Around 40,000 people, made homeless by the earthquake found accommodation in tented camps and a further 10,000 were housed in hotels on the coast. Others sought shelter with friends and relatives throughout Italy. The tent cities were equiped with services, including schools and a post office. Two of the districts were managed by military commands and here the local population protested that the military had over stepped their role in maintaining security, to the extent that the rigid regulations and tall fences around the camps made them seem like prisons. As a negative the National agencies swept into to L'Aquila and replaced the good work and participation of local organisations and volunteers, which led to resentment and only served to reduced self-sufficiency.
Emergency Response
Italy's emergency response to the L'Aquila earthquake was impressive. The main agency in Italy for disaster response is the Protezion Civile. They worked in conjunction with the firefighters and Italian volunteers to provide for shelter, food, and safety of the survivors. Within 24 hours L'Aquila hospital had been completely replaced by the first of two field hospitals that arrived in the area. Meanwhile, early management of casualties was largely in the hands of the Italian armed forces, which employed ‘Medivac’ aerial evacuation techniques to remove seriously injured patients to hospitals outside the disaster area. The earliest actions included the total evacuation of town centres, including the entire historical core of L’Aquila. One of the firsts tasks was to set up and manage the 171 tent camps that were established for homeless survivors and provide safe, secure environments for them. Around 40,000 people, made homeless by the earthquake found accommodation in tented camps and a further 10,000 were housed in hotels on the coast. Others sought shelter with friends and relatives throughout Italy. The tent cities were equiped with services, including schools and a post office. Two of the districts were managed by military commands and here the local population protested that the military had over stepped their role in maintaining security, to the extent that the rigid regulations and tall fences around the camps made them seem like prisons. As a negative the National agencies swept into to L'Aquila and replaced the good work and participation of local organisations and volunteers, which led to resentment and only served to reduced self-sufficiency.
Long Term Recovery
To achieve a direct transition from homelessness to secure accommodation survivors remained in tents and at coastal tourist accommodation throughout the summer, with some remaining in tents up for up to 8 months. Throughout this time there there were psychological problems associated with the fragmentation of pre-existing communities, especially among children.
Central government policy on rehousing the survivors concentrated almost exclusively, on the CASE project, which the government hailed as a great success. Residents were provided by the state with all basic necessities, including cutlery and bed linen. However, the complexes till this day lack virtually all external services, such as cafes and community services. Most of them are detached, even distant, from shops and other amenities. The infrastructure of the Aterno Valley, where they are located is completely inadequate and has not been upgraded. Furthermore, nothing has been done to stimulate employment. In fact many industries due to damaged buildings have moved out of the area. It is estimated that 26 000 people have been made unemployed by the earthquake—in an area in which the unemployment rate, at 12.2%, is higher than the national average and youth unemployment is officially 40%.
To achieve a direct transition from homelessness to secure accommodation survivors remained in tents and at coastal tourist accommodation throughout the summer, with some remaining in tents up for up to 8 months. Throughout this time there there were psychological problems associated with the fragmentation of pre-existing communities, especially among children.
Central government policy on rehousing the survivors concentrated almost exclusively, on the CASE project, which the government hailed as a great success. Residents were provided by the state with all basic necessities, including cutlery and bed linen. However, the complexes till this day lack virtually all external services, such as cafes and community services. Most of them are detached, even distant, from shops and other amenities. The infrastructure of the Aterno Valley, where they are located is completely inadequate and has not been upgraded. Furthermore, nothing has been done to stimulate employment. In fact many industries due to damaged buildings have moved out of the area. It is estimated that 26 000 people have been made unemployed by the earthquake—in an area in which the unemployment rate, at 12.2%, is higher than the national average and youth unemployment is officially 40%.
Read the following article on the delay of redevelopment in L'Aquila: BBC - L'Aquila - 4 years on
EVALUATION
In terms of evaluation it is clear that much more could have been done to improve local self-sufficiency and local participation, particularly in decision making, in where to locate the CASA project and how to integrate it better with community and economy. More could have been done to support local industry but at a time of economic austerity central government assistance has been restricted, which has onloy had an adverse effect on local economic. A number of lessons can be learned from the L’Aquila disaster. These include the following:
1. Apply the precautionary principle and take action to prepare for disaster when short-term forecasts of earthquakes are made, even if these are judged to be unreliable. There were hundreds of minor tremors prior to the major L’Aquila event, in addition to local observations of radon emmisions
2. Scientifically backed monitoring and alert systems should be supported by local plans to prepare for emergencies. In L’Aquila, local communities were advised that there was no threat of an imminent earthquake and thus they took no action, building regulations for public building had fallen short of modern standards.
3. Greater cooperation between national agencies and local agencies and volunteering could have improved self-sufficiency and local motivation
4. Temporary tents settlements and coastal rehousing led to fragmentation, isolation and increased psychological trauma. More consideration is needed in how maintain community support structures
5. Increased participation in decision making would have improved self-sufficiency and local well-being
6. Long term housing projects need to be fully intergrated with community needs and economy and more emphasis should be placed on supporting local industries that at can maintain local economic stability.
EVALUATION
In terms of evaluation it is clear that much more could have been done to improve local self-sufficiency and local participation, particularly in decision making, in where to locate the CASA project and how to integrate it better with community and economy. More could have been done to support local industry but at a time of economic austerity central government assistance has been restricted, which has onloy had an adverse effect on local economic. A number of lessons can be learned from the L’Aquila disaster. These include the following:
1. Apply the precautionary principle and take action to prepare for disaster when short-term forecasts of earthquakes are made, even if these are judged to be unreliable. There were hundreds of minor tremors prior to the major L’Aquila event, in addition to local observations of radon emmisions
2. Scientifically backed monitoring and alert systems should be supported by local plans to prepare for emergencies. In L’Aquila, local communities were advised that there was no threat of an imminent earthquake and thus they took no action, building regulations for public building had fallen short of modern standards.
3. Greater cooperation between national agencies and local agencies and volunteering could have improved self-sufficiency and local motivation
4. Temporary tents settlements and coastal rehousing led to fragmentation, isolation and increased psychological trauma. More consideration is needed in how maintain community support structures
5. Increased participation in decision making would have improved self-sufficiency and local well-being
6. Long term housing projects need to be fully intergrated with community needs and economy and more emphasis should be placed on supporting local industries that at can maintain local economic stability.
The Management of Cyclone Nargis, Myanmar (Burma) 2008
Preparation
In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, the military government were accused by many of failing to act to protect its people. The authorities were well aware of the threat from Cyclone Nargis but failed to issue a timely warning to those in the path of the storm. India's meteorological agency, which monitors cyclones in the Indian Ocean, says it warned the Burmese authorities 48 hours before the storm struck. The agency says it told Burma where the storm would hit land and how severe it was expected to be.
Reports from within Burma suggested citizens had complained that they were not properly warned and that Burmese state television issued statements in English, which the the vast majority of Burmese cannot understand. In contrast government statements read, "Timely weather reports were announced and aired through the television and radio in order to keep the people safe and secure,". Certainly it appears that state media did give some warning of a storm, but many people in Burma have suggested that the strength of the cyclone was unclear and no one was given information as to what action they should take. Officials from the UN's disaster reduction agency in Geneva stated that it is clear many people did not have time to seek refuge in secure buildings. They say the scale of the disaster suggests there was no proper early warning system.
The above commentary of the level of preparation in Burma ahead of the cyclone offers a damning endictment into the level of care in regard to preparation. The majority of Burmese were left with limited information and barely any perception of risk when they went to bed on May 1st.
In part defence of the authorities of Burma, strong cyclone storms are not frequent events in Burma, seldom do they reach the Burmese coastline and seldom are they so powerful. This is in strong contrast to the frequent earthquakes that affect Italy. As a result Burma has little experience of managing natural disasters. Unlike its neighbouring country Bangladesh, which experiences cyclones more frequently, Burma has not developed lines of communication for effective evacuation and it does not have coastal defences and cyclone shelters like Bangladesh. Compounding the problems of preparation is Burma's state of development. Burma is very undeveloped and its coatsline is so remote that many regions are only accessible by a day's travel by boat.
However, despite these mitigating factors we have to conclude that there was a clear failure to prepare the people for the storm. People were not adequately warned of the severity of the incoming storm and tidal surge, which then led to the devastating death toll of over 138000 people.
Emergency Response
The emergency response in Burma was limited by many factors. The vast area impacted by the storm and tidal surge along the Irrawaddy Delta and the remoteness and inaccassability of the region meant that military and other emergency reponse groups could not get to many rural settlements. Many thousands of people were simply left to fend for themselves. The tidal surge, in addition destroyed boats and harbours and swept away many bridges, roads and pathways making the delta even more inaccessible. As a low income country Burma lacks the vital infrastructure for an adequate response. With no emergency helipcopters and food stocks many people felt abandoned. There were reports of little or no food aid getting to the people. Some villages reported back that a lottery decided which families received food aid. In short, food and clean water was in woefully short in supply. There was fear of outbreaks of disease. In more accessible villages miltray groups were bale to provided aid via boats and many people were moved to temporary shelters. There was in general reports of a poor first response. Most bodies were placed in mass graves and many bodies remained on the ground or in water for many days after the storm. This would have further increased disease. Some reports suggest the authorities moved into the recovery stage before adequately tending to the dead and the survivors. In addition, a lot of international aid was prevented from entering the country, which at the time led to international condemnation. However, Burma did cooperate with its regional partners, like China and Malaysia, allowing some food aid into the country. However one week after the storm only one of six available UN helicopters had been allowed entry into Burma and many other international emergency response teams. specially trained for disaster response had not been allowed entry due to beauracratic issues like visa control. One positive factors relates tot he presense of aid agenicies in Burma such as the red cross. These domestic aid groups were able to immediatly respond to the needs of more accessible settlements. In conclusion despite the political complexity of Burma's relationship with western governments it should be recognised that the Burmese authorities would have saved more lives and reduced the hardship on its people had it cooperated more effectively with the international community.
Preparation
In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, the military government were accused by many of failing to act to protect its people. The authorities were well aware of the threat from Cyclone Nargis but failed to issue a timely warning to those in the path of the storm. India's meteorological agency, which monitors cyclones in the Indian Ocean, says it warned the Burmese authorities 48 hours before the storm struck. The agency says it told Burma where the storm would hit land and how severe it was expected to be.
Reports from within Burma suggested citizens had complained that they were not properly warned and that Burmese state television issued statements in English, which the the vast majority of Burmese cannot understand. In contrast government statements read, "Timely weather reports were announced and aired through the television and radio in order to keep the people safe and secure,". Certainly it appears that state media did give some warning of a storm, but many people in Burma have suggested that the strength of the cyclone was unclear and no one was given information as to what action they should take. Officials from the UN's disaster reduction agency in Geneva stated that it is clear many people did not have time to seek refuge in secure buildings. They say the scale of the disaster suggests there was no proper early warning system.
The above commentary of the level of preparation in Burma ahead of the cyclone offers a damning endictment into the level of care in regard to preparation. The majority of Burmese were left with limited information and barely any perception of risk when they went to bed on May 1st.
In part defence of the authorities of Burma, strong cyclone storms are not frequent events in Burma, seldom do they reach the Burmese coastline and seldom are they so powerful. This is in strong contrast to the frequent earthquakes that affect Italy. As a result Burma has little experience of managing natural disasters. Unlike its neighbouring country Bangladesh, which experiences cyclones more frequently, Burma has not developed lines of communication for effective evacuation and it does not have coastal defences and cyclone shelters like Bangladesh. Compounding the problems of preparation is Burma's state of development. Burma is very undeveloped and its coatsline is so remote that many regions are only accessible by a day's travel by boat.
However, despite these mitigating factors we have to conclude that there was a clear failure to prepare the people for the storm. People were not adequately warned of the severity of the incoming storm and tidal surge, which then led to the devastating death toll of over 138000 people.
Emergency Response
The emergency response in Burma was limited by many factors. The vast area impacted by the storm and tidal surge along the Irrawaddy Delta and the remoteness and inaccassability of the region meant that military and other emergency reponse groups could not get to many rural settlements. Many thousands of people were simply left to fend for themselves. The tidal surge, in addition destroyed boats and harbours and swept away many bridges, roads and pathways making the delta even more inaccessible. As a low income country Burma lacks the vital infrastructure for an adequate response. With no emergency helipcopters and food stocks many people felt abandoned. There were reports of little or no food aid getting to the people. Some villages reported back that a lottery decided which families received food aid. In short, food and clean water was in woefully short in supply. There was fear of outbreaks of disease. In more accessible villages miltray groups were bale to provided aid via boats and many people were moved to temporary shelters. There was in general reports of a poor first response. Most bodies were placed in mass graves and many bodies remained on the ground or in water for many days after the storm. This would have further increased disease. Some reports suggest the authorities moved into the recovery stage before adequately tending to the dead and the survivors. In addition, a lot of international aid was prevented from entering the country, which at the time led to international condemnation. However, Burma did cooperate with its regional partners, like China and Malaysia, allowing some food aid into the country. However one week after the storm only one of six available UN helicopters had been allowed entry into Burma and many other international emergency response teams. specially trained for disaster response had not been allowed entry due to beauracratic issues like visa control. One positive factors relates tot he presense of aid agenicies in Burma such as the red cross. These domestic aid groups were able to immediatly respond to the needs of more accessible settlements. In conclusion despite the political complexity of Burma's relationship with western governments it should be recognised that the Burmese authorities would have saved more lives and reduced the hardship on its people had it cooperated more effectively with the international community.
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Long Term Recovery
The long term recovery of Burma has been slow. Burma with its lack of resources and wealth has faced enormous challenges in its recovery. The scale of the disaster was one of the 10 most deadliest storms in modern history and so any recovery would be difficult. However given the state of development as well as the lack of experience in managing hazards the recovery inevitably has been painfully slow. Large infrastructure projects like bridge building and house construction have been slow and aid agencies have taken an important role but despite their efforts recovery has been held back by a lack of funding and limited media exposure. The initial recovery did improve from the first weeks, one month after the disaster many aid agencies were able to operate successfully in the delta and within a month many people had returned to the villages and built temporary shelters rather than remain in military camps, where the fear of disease outbreaks was a major concern.
A key success factor in Burma's recovery is found in the emormous resilience and independence of the people. In the short term, this means people quickly get back to homes and attempt to get on with things. One month after the disaster 50 percent of the population were able to buy food from local markets. This resilience like in many LICs is led by necessity. The government was simply unable to provide for the people. The problems for recovery tend to be long term. Stabilising food supply and draining fields, ensuring viable industries like fishing, renewing storm surge resistent housing and improving long term security are all major problems that won't be achieved without international support. The people themselves are also held back in the longer term by grief and trauma and require psychosocial support. Many aid agencies like the Red Cross and Merlin have been operating in the delta providing this type of support but without continued comprehensive international support the scale of the recovery remians localised. Long term recovery looks likley to be held back for many years.
The long term recovery of Burma has been slow. Burma with its lack of resources and wealth has faced enormous challenges in its recovery. The scale of the disaster was one of the 10 most deadliest storms in modern history and so any recovery would be difficult. However given the state of development as well as the lack of experience in managing hazards the recovery inevitably has been painfully slow. Large infrastructure projects like bridge building and house construction have been slow and aid agencies have taken an important role but despite their efforts recovery has been held back by a lack of funding and limited media exposure. The initial recovery did improve from the first weeks, one month after the disaster many aid agencies were able to operate successfully in the delta and within a month many people had returned to the villages and built temporary shelters rather than remain in military camps, where the fear of disease outbreaks was a major concern.
A key success factor in Burma's recovery is found in the emormous resilience and independence of the people. In the short term, this means people quickly get back to homes and attempt to get on with things. One month after the disaster 50 percent of the population were able to buy food from local markets. This resilience like in many LICs is led by necessity. The government was simply unable to provide for the people. The problems for recovery tend to be long term. Stabilising food supply and draining fields, ensuring viable industries like fishing, renewing storm surge resistent housing and improving long term security are all major problems that won't be achieved without international support. The people themselves are also held back in the longer term by grief and trauma and require psychosocial support. Many aid agencies like the Red Cross and Merlin have been operating in the delta providing this type of support but without continued comprehensive international support the scale of the recovery remians localised. Long term recovery looks likley to be held back for many years.
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Evaluation
Many lesson can be learned from Cyclone Nargis in regard to prearation, emergency response and long term recovery. There are clear falings in all three areas.
1. Despite receiving earling warning Burma failed to effectively communicate the warning to the people. Consequently people were left with low perception of risk.
2. No evacuation warning was provided.
3. The emergency response for remote regions was slow and inadequate, food supplies and infrastructure were limited and inadequate.
4. Beaurcratic delays and the early refusal of available international support, given the scale of the humanitarian disaster was inexcusable.
5. Some reports suggested authorities moved to fast into recovery leaving individuals to recover the dead.
6. The success of long term recovery will depend on the ability of the Burmese authorities to make stronger and more trusting relationships with the international community.
Many lesson can be learned from Cyclone Nargis in regard to prearation, emergency response and long term recovery. There are clear falings in all three areas.
1. Despite receiving earling warning Burma failed to effectively communicate the warning to the people. Consequently people were left with low perception of risk.
2. No evacuation warning was provided.
3. The emergency response for remote regions was slow and inadequate, food supplies and infrastructure were limited and inadequate.
4. Beaurcratic delays and the early refusal of available international support, given the scale of the humanitarian disaster was inexcusable.
5. Some reports suggested authorities moved to fast into recovery leaving individuals to recover the dead.
6. The success of long term recovery will depend on the ability of the Burmese authorities to make stronger and more trusting relationships with the international community.